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INTRODUCTION

What is an orphan work? When you hear the term “orphan
work,” do you immediately think of a copyright dressed in rags and
holding a bowl saying, “Please, sir, I want some more?” à la Mark
Lester as the orphan Oliver in the movie of the same name?3 Have you
ever interacted with, viewed, read, heard, or used an orphan work? Are
you an author of an orphan work? These are all important questions
regarding the issues of orphan works in the United States and, more
broadly, the entire world. The answer to at least one of these questions
is almost certainly “yes” for the vast majority of the United States
population, even though most people probably do not realize it.
The majority of twentieth and twenty-first century original
works of authorship probably fall within a general definition of orphan
works.4 It has been estimated that up to ninety percent of all works
presently under copyright fall within a definition of orphan works.5
These numbers and the severity of the orphan works problem, however,
are by no means universally accepted. Certain national trade groups and
unions have disputed the severity or actual existence of an orphan
works problem.6 The Copyright Office, however, refutes these views as
outliers from the general consensus that a substantial orphan works
problem is at hand.7
The explosion in the number of photographs taken since the
year 2000 is a prime example of the increase in the number of
copyrighted works created and the potential for exasperation from the
orphan works problem. Kodak estimated that 80 billion photographs
2

Copyright, TWAINQUOTES.COM, http://www.twainquotes.com/Copyright.html (last
visited May 14, 2016) (collecting quotes by Mark Twain by subject).
3
OLIVER! (Columbia Pictures 1968).
4
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUB. DOMAIN. DUKE LAW SCH., ORPHAN WORKS
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 2 (Mar. 2005),
https://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/pdf/cspdproposal.pdf [hereinafter ORPHAN WORKS
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL]; Orphan Works, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUB.
DOMAIN, https://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/orphanworks.html (last visited May 14, 2016).
5
Helen Sedwick, The Problem of Orphan Works, HELEN SEDWICK (Nov. 22, 2015),
http://helensedwick.com/the-problem-of-orphan-works/.
6
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION: A REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 37 (June 2015), http://copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphanworks2015.pdf [hereinafter ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION] (referencing
statements by the Authors Guild, Inc. and the National Writers Union).
7
Id. at 37–38.
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were taken worldwide in the year 2000, which set a new record for
photos taken in a year.8 It is estimated that more than 1 trillion
photographs were taken worldwide in 2015.9 Of those one trillion
photos taken, an estimated 748 billion were taken using cameras in
phones.10 Now imagine how those billions and billions of photographs
are made public through sharing in social media and mobile
applications.
Facebook, at the close of 2015, had over 1.5 billion monthly
active users worldwide who posted 300 million photos per day.11
According to Snapchat, a photo sharing application, in mid-2015 there
were 8,796 photos shared every second. That equates to 759,974,400
photos shared per day by users on the application.12 These statistics do
not take into account other photo sharing sites such as Whatsapp,
Flickr, Pinterest, or Tapiture, among many others, that also account for
millions of photo postings each day.13 The sharing and re-sharing of
billions of photographs each year will likely lead to a loss of the
identity of the original owner of photographs and an explosion in the
number of works that fall within a general definition of orphan works.
This proliferation of authorship, in part due to technological
advancements like the camera phone, has created a vast ocean of works
whose authorship is often difficult to ascertain at best and absolutely
indeterminable at worst . These orphan works are then left to live in the
orphanage of copyright limbo, neither able to further the advancement
of culture through their use nor able to benefit their authors through
licensing and monetization. Due to this, the issue of orphan works
8

Stephen Heyman, Photos, Photos Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/arts/international/photos-photoseverywhere.html?_r=0.
9
Id.; Jaron Schneider, Infographics: There Will Be One Trillion Photos Taken in 2015,
RESOURCE MAG. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://resourcemagonline.com/2014/12/infographicthere-will-be-one-trillion-photos-taken-in-2015/45332/.
10
Id.
11
The Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics – Updated December 2015, ZEPHORIA
DIGITAL MARKETING, https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics/ (last
visited May 14, 2016).
12
If you were to view all the photos shared on Snapchat in the last hour how long would
it take?, CEWE-PHOTOWORLD.COM, https://cewe-photoworld.com/how-big-is-snapchat/
(last visited May 14, 2016); Kimberlee Morrison, How Many Photos Are Uploaded to
Snapchat Every Second?, SOCI. TIMES (Jun. 9, 2015, 10:00 AM),
http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/how-many-photos-are-uploaded-to-snapchat-everysecond/621488.
13
Morrison, supra note 12.
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legislation has been a growing topic of interest for inclusion into the
United States Copyright Act.
The issue of orphan works legislation has been kicked around,
debated, lamented, and generally stressed over for more than a decade
in the United States. This handwringing over orphan works legislation
has not been, and is not, a one-sided affair. Both the creators of original
works of authorship and potential users of those works have had, and
continue to have, serious reservations concerning the potential passage
of orphan works legislation and the potential impact thereof.
On June 4, 2015, the United States Copyright Office issued
Orphaned Works and Mass Digitalization: A Report of the Register of
Copyright14 (“2015 Report”). The 2015 Report, in part, outlines the
Copyright Office’s proposal for orphan works legislation and the
reasoning behind the recommendations. The 2015 Report was lauded
by many as the best-yet proposed solution to the orphan works issue in
the United States. At the same time, it also brought a firestorm of anger
and dread that the solutions proposed by the 2015 Report would strip
authors of their basic right and ability to control their own works.
There can be little argument that the orphan works issue has
become divisive and hyperbolic in the United States. A basic Internet
search of “orphan works” finds thousands search results on the
subject.15 In general, the spectrum of many of the search results range
from “the sky is falling” alarmism that the government is going to take
away copyrights from authors and make works available for use by
anyone without regard for the author to even-minded, thoughtful
analysis of proposed orphan works legislation to cheerleaders for
addressing the orphan works issue with very little regard for authors.16
This paper will examine the issue of orphan works in general,
issues that orphan works legislation brings into question, and the
legislation proposed by the Copyright Office in the 2015 Report. This
paper will then offer analysis and recommendations regarding the
handling of orphan works in the United States. As there is presently no
statutory law regarding orphan works in the United States, this paper
14

ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 6.
Orphan Works – Google Search, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/search?sourceid=chrome-psyapi2&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF8&q=Orphan%20Works&oq=Orphan%20Works&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j0l5.1906j0j7 (last
visited May 14, 2016).
16
See e.g., A Little More Orphan Works, RICHMOND ILLUSTRATION, INC., (JULY 21,
2015), http://www.tomrichmond.com/2015/07/21/a-little-more-orphan-works/ (spanning
all three categories).
15
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will focus on the perspectives of numerous groups, including: artists,
non-profit institutions, for-profit companies, and the Copyright Office.
Finally, this paper will endeavor to provide observations and analyses
that are applicable to academic readers, practitioners, and laypersons.
II.

ORPHAN WORKS IN THEORY

Prior to delving into an analysis of the 2015 Report and
considering recommendations for future legislation, it is important to
get a perspective of the state of orphan works today. This
understanding includes: how orphan works are defined in the legal
profession; , what falls within the definition of orphan works; and what,
if anything, could possibly be excluded from orphan works.
A. Orphan Works Generally Defined
What is the definition of orphan works? It depends upon
whom you ask. There is no official, codified definition of orphan
works. The Copyright Act of 1976 does not address or define orphan
works. The “Report on Orphaned Works” issued by the Copyright
Office in 2006 (“2006 Report”) defines orphan works as: “a term used
to describe the situation where the owner of a copyrighted work cannot
be identified and located by someone who wishes to make use of the
work in a manner that requires permission of the copyright owner.”17
This definition, however, was never codified or officially
adopted. The 2015 Report discusses orphan works in depth but never
provides a standalone definition of orphan works. However, the 2015
Report does include a Federal Register entry for notice of inquiry
regarding the 2015 Report that notes and expands on the 2006 Report
definition: “An ‘orphan work’ is an original work of authorship for
which a good faith, prospective user cannot readily identify and/or
locate the copyright owner(s) in a situation where permission from the
copyright owner(s) is necessary as a matter of law.”18
By researching beyond the Copyright Office, a number of
differing definitions of orphan works can be found. The NOLO PlainLanguage Dictionary takes a more simplistic approach, defining orphan
works as: “Works protected under copyright whose owners are difficult
17

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER
OF COPYRIGHTS 1 (Jan. 2006), http://copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.
18
ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 6, app. B.
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to locate -- for example, a photograph taken of Elvis Presley as a
teenager, or a newspaper column from a 1950s newspaper.”19
The Cornell University Law School’s Legal Information
Institute has also adopted the NOLO definition.20 USLegal.com defines
an orphan work as:
Orphan works are works which are under
copyright, but whose owner or the estate either
cannot be found or cannot be identified. Sometimes
the name of the creator or copyright owner may be
known but other than the name no information can be
established. Other reasons for a work to be orphan
include that the copyright owner is unaware of their
ownership or that the copyright owner has died and it
is not possible to establish to whom ownership of the
copyright has passed.21
Legal standards such as Black’s Law Dictionary22 and the FindLaw
Legal Dictionary23 have no listings for or definitions of “orphan works”
at all.
An examination of the varying definitions brings to light a
number of general similarities but also a glaring lack of specific
similarities. The overarching issue in all definitions of orphan works is:
who is the owner of the copyright in question?, and, can that copyright
owner be contacted? There are other substantive issues to be considered
when defining orphan works that are not expressly covered in any of
the definitions above.
B. Is a Work Truly an Orphan or Only Anti-Social?
When professionals and scholars in the legal profession cannot
make a determination of what constitutes orphan works, it is unlikely
19

Orphan Works, NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/orphan-works-term.html (last visited May 14, 2016).
20
Orphan works, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/orphan_works (last visited May 14, 2016).
21
Orphan Work Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM,
http://definitions.uslegal.com/o/orphan-work/ (last visited May 14, 2016).
22
THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org (last visited May 14, 2016)
(“[f]eaturing” Black’s Law Dictionary).
23
FindLaw Legal Dictionary, FINDLAW, http://dictionary.findlaw.com (last visited May
14, 2016).
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that a non-legal professional or copyright owner will have much luck
doing so or even be familiar with the term “orphan works.” A
comparison of the language of the differing definitions of orphan works
illustrates a significant issue in addressing the orphan works problem;
what, exactly, constitutes an orphan work?
For the moment, let us accept the basic premise, for
argument’s sake, that an orphan work is a work of authorship whose
owner cannot be readily identified and/or located by a prospective user
of the work in question and for which a license would more likely than
not be required from the copyright owner for the proposed use. Now
consider a situation in which an owner of a copyrighted work can be
identified and can be located but simply refuses to reply or have any
contact with the proposed licensor of the copyrighted work. If the artist
is a recluse, à la J.D. Salinger, or living off the grid, and affirmatively
chooses to ignore all requests for a license, does this make the work an
orphan?
According to the 2015 Report, these types of situations may or
may not create an orphan work situation. In the 2015 Report, the act of
locating the owner of a copyright is consistently equated with a
response from the copyright owner in order to avoid the work being
designated as an orphan work. The issue of an intentionally nonresponsive copyright owner is never addressed. However, it is
addressed in the proposed orphan works legislation, which states that if
a copyright owner fails to respond to “any inquiry or other
communication,” the non-response by the copyright owner is not
enough to qualify as a diligent search.24 This could be read to mean
non-responses to multiple requests in conjunction with other searches
would be enough to qualify as a diligent search for the purpose of an
orphan works limitation of liability. A potential user could make a
reasonable argument that multiple non-responses to license requests
submitted to a copyright owner’s last known address indicate that the
copyright owner cannot be “located.” If the copyright owner cannot be
“located” and other diligent searches have been performed, the work
could then be designated an orphan work because the copyright owner
chose not to respond to the license requests. This situation could create
an affirmative duty on the part of the copyright owner to respond to all

24

ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 6, app. A at 3–4 (giving
proposed language for amended 17 U.S.C. § 514(b)(2)(A)(iv)(II)).
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copyright license requests in order to avoid an orphan work designation
for the work requested.
The establishment of an affirmative duty on the part of all
copyright owners to reply to all licensing requests creates a
consequential new burden upon copyright owners. This situation would
be a significant departure from the general premise that copyright
owners have the right to control their copyrights as they see fit with the
affirmative duty of obtaining a license on the prospective user. This
scenario, although potentially in the minority of licensing requests, is
nonetheless important to consider, as this could be the creation of a new
affirmative duty on the part of the copyright owner, which would be a
significant departure from the present requirements of copyright
owners. The examination of a situation similar to this one leads to the
consideration of what other tenets of copyright might be affected if
orphan works legislation is enacted.
C. The Inclusion of Unpublished Works in Orphan Works
The question of whether both published and unpublished
works should be included within the definition of orphan works is
controversial and sharply contested. As a matter of practicality, the
issue of what constitutes a published work is itself sharply debated.
While this paper does not fully discuss what constitutes published and
unpublished works,25 it is important to address the published and
unpublished works issue as it pertains to the orphan works discussion.
The inclusion of unpublished works into the orphan works
discussion must bring about the recognition that a copyright owner
generally has the right to control the first publication of a work.26 The
right to first publication, although not expressly set forth within 17
U.S.C. § 106, is addressed in several other sections of the 1976
Copyright Act, including sections 108 and 115.27 Furthermore, the
United States Supreme Court in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
25

For more information on the issue of what constitutes a published work, see generally
RayMing Chang, Publication Does Not Really Mean Publication: The Need to Amend the
Definition of Publication in the Copyright Act, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 225 (2005), and Deborah
R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135
(2011). See also Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a Functional Definition of Publication in
Copyright Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1724, 1770 (2008).
26
ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 6, at 85 n.346 (citing Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985)).
27
Id.
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Nation Enterprises stated that “[t]he fact that a work is unpublished is a
critical element of its ‘nature.’”28 Although Harper & Row was a case
dealing with fair use, the Court did not qualify that statement as only
applying to the fair use analysis.
The acknowledgement by the Court of the importance of
whether a work is published or unpublished should cause pause when
considering if orphan works should include unpublished works. If
being unpublished is a “critical element” to the “nature” of the work’s
copyright, then the next question must be: What constitutes
publication? Again, this is not an easy question to answer. The
Copyright Act of 1976 defines publication as:
“Publication” is the distribution of copies or
phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.
The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a
group of persons for purposes of further distribution,
public performance, or public display, constitutes
publication. A public performance or display of a
work does not of itself constitute publication.
To perform or display a work “publicly” means—
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a
performance or display of the work to a place
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance or
display receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times.29
This definition, however, is not as straightforward as it may first
appear. Because this definition of publication was created prior to the
28

Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 564 (citing 3 NIMMER 13.05[A]; Joseph R. Re,
Comment, Stage of Publication as a ‘Fair Use’ Factor: Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 58 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597, 613 (1984)).
29
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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advent of the Internet and digital distribution, it has not been able to
keep pace with the rapid development of technology. The Copyright
Office stated in a Circular that the 17 U.S.C. § 101 definition of
“publication” does not address online transmission of works and that it
is up to the person filing for a copyright to make the determination
whether a work had been published or not at the time of copyright
application.30
The courts have made numerous rulings since the adoption of
the “publication” definition in 17 U.S.C. § 101 that have created
significant confusion in determining when publication has actually
occurred. Three rulings out of the Southern District of New York
highlight this confusion. The court in Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi
ruled that the posting of a webpage was enough to constitute
publication.31 The court in Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Productions found
that a posting of an off Broadway play performance on the Internet did
not constitute publication, even if it did constitute distribution, due to a
lack of commercial exploitation, which the court said was required for
publication.32 The court in McLaren v. Chico’s FAS, Inc. found that the
mere posting of images onto a website did not rise to the level of
publication.33
Cases from a variety of other courts further illustrate the
inconsistencies in this area. A court in the Northern District of
California commented that the act of posting a website online and
making it open to the public was enough to constitute publication.34
Another court in the Southern District of Florida ruled that the posting
of a music file to the Internet was enough to constitute publication, if
the music file was available to be downloaded by the public.35 But, a
court in the Southern District of Texas ruled that the posting of
webpages online was not enough to constitute distribution of the
webpages and therefore did not rise to the level of publication.36
30

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 66, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR ONLINE
WORKS 3 (2009), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ66.pdf [hereinafter CIRCULAR 66].
31
Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). This
decision has been significantly criticized. See e.g. RayMing Chang, supra note 25, at 239.
32
Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
33
McLaren v. Chico’s FAS, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 2481(JSR), 2010 WL 4615772, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010).
34
Sleep Sci. Partners v. Lieberman, No. 09-04200 CW, 2010 WL 1881770, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. May 10, 2010).
35
Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
36
Rogers v. Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc., No. H-10-3741 (Aug. 15, 2011).
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Adding to the confusion of what constitutes publication for the
purpose of copyright is the consideration of when a particular
copyrighted work was potentially published. The applicable definition
for what constitutes publication depends on when the publication
supposedly took place.37 If the purported publication of a work took
place prior to January 1, 1978, then the present statutory definition, set
forth above, would not be applied. The copyright holder or the court
would be required to determine what constituted publication under the
law at the time the work was claimed to be published.
Taking into consideration the above issues of defining what
constitutes publication, when and if publication occurred, and the
Copyright Office’s admission that technology issues have out-stretched
the pre-Internet Copyright Act, it is not difficult to imagine an
untenable situation arising if unpublished works were excluded from
orphan works legislation. The exclusion of unpublished works from
any orphan works legislation would potentially create more of a
quagmire within the United States copyright system than presently
exists with no orphan works legislation. Each potential designation of a
work as an orphan work could be challenged on the grounds of
publication, potentially clogging the courts with thousands of cases
over publication or lack thereof.
While copyright owners’ rights to control first publication are
important, they are by no means sacrosanct. The Copyright Office
acknowledges that the definition of “publication” in 17 U.S.C. § 101 is
out of date and in need of revision.38 The courts, as set forth above,
have provided very little continuity in determining what constitutes
publication and how the statutory definition should be interpreted and
applied. Some courts appear to have broadened the definition of
publication in some circumstances in an attempt to address new issues
in on-line publication that were not foreseeable by the drafters of the
1976 Copyright Act. As distasteful as it might be for copyright owners,
the inclusion of unpublished works must necessarily be included in any
orphan works legislation in order to create a semi-functional orphan
works solution.

37
38

Cotter supra note 25, at 1726; Gerhardt supra note 25, at 6.
CIRCULAR 66, supra note 30.

213

THE ORPHAN WORKS PROBLEM

III.

[7:202 2016]

PROPOSED ORPHAN WORKS LEGISLATION

The Copyright Office states in the 2015 Report, “[t]he goal of
any orphan works provision should be to unite owners and users.”39 To
this end, the Copyright Office proposed a general “limited liability”
model of orphan works legislation that it believes will be the best fit for
the United States copyright system.40 This model would apply to both
commercial and noncommercial actors and have an eye on global
copyright developments.41 The 2015 Report also set forth a number of
specific recommendations for the application of future orphan works
legislation.
A. Case-By-Case v. Systematic Analysis
Following the release of the 2015 Report, one of the many
concerns reported throughout the blogosphere was concern over a mass
taking of copyright owners’ rights.42 The perception by some was that
the new orphan works recommendations were set to broadly designate
huge groups of works as orphan works for anyone to use and profit
from with no concern for the copyright owner. This could not be further
from the truth.
This confusion may have arisen due to the 2015 Report’s dual
purpose: addressing both orphan works and mass digitalization. The
2015 Report takes drastically different approaches to each issue,
addressing orphan works on a case-by-case basis and mass

39

ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 6, at 60.
Id. at 3.
Id.
42
See generally Brad Holland, The Return of Orphan Works: “The Next Great Copyright
Act,” POOR BRADFORD’S ALMANAC (Jul. 2, 2015),
http://www.drawger.com/holland/?article_id=15400; Brett, Don’t Believe the Hyperbole,
There’s No Orphan Works Law Before Congress (Updated), GRAPHIC POLICY: WHERE
BOOKS AND POLITICS MEET… (Jul. 20, 2015), http://graphicpolicy.com/2015/07/20/dontbelieve-the-hyperbole-theres-no-orphan-works-law-before-congress/; Google Prevails in
Copyright Lawsuit, ILLUSTRATOR’S P’SHIP ORPHAN WORKS BLOG (Oct. 16, 2015),
http://ipaorphanworks.blogspot.com; Katie Lane, What’s This “Orphan Works” Business
About?, WORK MADE FOR HIRE (Jul. 2015), http://www.workmadeforhire.net/therest/whats-this-orphan-works-business-about/; Sedwick, supra note 5; Michael Zhang,
Orphan Works Copyright Law Being Considered Again in the US, PETAPIXEL (Jul. 21,
2015), http://petapixel.com/2015/07/21/orphan-works-copyright-law-being-consideredagain-in-the-us/.
40
41
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digitalization on a blanket systematic basis,43 although this may not
always be clear to the casual reader. One of the other areas that may
have exacerbated copyright owners’ concerns was that the 2015 Report
focused heavily on nonprofit institutions, such as archives, educational
institutions, libraries, museums, and public broadcasters, and the
problems that these institutions faced regarding orphan works in their
collections.44 Nevertheless, the 2015 Report specifically set forth that
the entire recommendation on the orphan works problem was based
upon a case-by-case application.45 This recommendation of a case-bycase application, however, is not universally applauded.
There are factions within the groups of archives, libraries, and
museums that contend that a case-by-case system is overly burdensome
and completely unworkable for institutions that may hold hundreds or
thousands of works that could be orphaned.46 These groups are
concerned that the steps that would be required to be taken in order to
reach the orphan works limitation on liability would be so time
consuming and expensive as to make their execution untenable.47
The Copyright Office recognized the concerns of nonprofit
institutions and formulated an extended safe harbor for nonprofit
educational institutions, museums, libraries, archives, and public
broadcasting entities.48 The extended safe harbor for these nonprofit
institutions would provide for further limited liability for qualifying
uses. If a qualifying nonprofit could show that it had: 1) complied with
the other orphan works safe harbor requirements; 2) performed the
infringement without any intent of direct or indirect commercial
advantage; 3) used the orphan work primarily for educational, religious,
or charitable purposes; and 4) promptly ceased use of the orphan work
upon notification of copyright infringement from the copyright owner,
then a court would be barred from ordering the nonprofit institution to
pay even reasonable compensation for the use of the work.49 However,
this extended safe harbor would not be applicable to qualifying
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nonprofit institutions that did not comply with all of the requirements
set forth above.50
The Copyright Office noted in the 2015 Report that nonprofit
educational institutions, museums, libraries, archives, and public
broadcasting entities use of works for educational, religious, or
charitable purposes may tangentially touch on commercial use as
well.51 The inclusion of the qualifier “primarily” in step 3 of the
nonprofit extended safe harbor is intentional. The 2015 Report
acknowledges that nonprofit educational, religious, or charitable
purposes may at times generate minor commercial revenue. The
Copyright Office makes clear that potential for minor commercial
revenue is not an automatic disqualifier from the nonprofit extended
safe harbor. As long as the purpose is primarily for nonprofit
educational, religious, or charitable purposes, that is enough to qualify
for the orphan works nonprofit extended safe harbor.
The Copyright Office also noted in the 2015 Report that a
case-by-case application instead of blanket systematic uses would
provide greater protection for copyright owners.52 This would be
achieved through the prerequisite that each potential user of a work be
required to take the appropriate steps to reach the orphan works
limitation on liability. No potential user of a work would be allowed to
free ride on the prior research and filing of a previous user.53 By each
potential user being required to do the appropriate research and file the
required forms, it is presumed to be more likely that a copyright owner
may be identified and contacted before a future use of the owner’s
copyrighted work.54 Through these required steps, it is then more likely
to put the copyright owner on notice that the work in question may be
considered an orphan work by other potential users, as well as
providing the copyright owner with possible licensing fees for the
work.
The result is that a case-by-case system is friendlier to
copyright owners due to the requirement of individual research into
each orphan work prior to the application of an orphan works limitation
of liability, thus creating a greater chance of identifying the copyright
50
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owner and removing that work from an orphan work designation. At
the same time, the case-by-case system also takes into consideration the
importance of protecting nonprofit institutions and the work that they
do in the preservation of works.
B. Reaching the Orphan Works Limitation on Liability
The 2015 Report proposes a two-step process for inclusion in
the proposed orphan works legislation.55 These steps, as part of the
limited liability scheme proposal, would be requirements for any
orphan work user before receiving the orphan works limitation of
liability protection.
1.

Good Faith Diligent Search

Anyone that has ever done any type of copyright clearance is
familiar with the research that goes into making sure that all of the
proper rights are acquired and that nothing is missed. The research can
be time intensive and involves searching broad and diverse realms. This
is precisely what the Copyright Office proposes to be Step One in order
to reach the orphan works limitation on liability: a “good faith diligent
search.”56
a.

Domestic Searches

The 2015 Report proposes to “[d]efine a diligent search as, at
a minimum, searching Copyright Office records; searching sources of
copyright authorship, ownership, and licensing; using technology tools;
and using databases, all as reasonable and appropriate under the
circumstances.”57 However, the 2015 Report goes on to specify that a
search is only diligent if a user searches and utilizes, “(1) Copyright
Office online records; (2) reasonably available sources of copyright
authorship and ownership information, including licensor information
where appropriate; (3) technology tools and, where reasonable, expert
assistance (such as a professional researcher or attorney); and (4)
appropriate databases, including online databases.”58
55
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As discussed previously, each use is evaluated on a case-bycase basis, and each search must be reasonable for the individual case
and circumstances. A good faith diligent search for the copyright owner
of a book or a play may require a user to search Copyright Office
online records, perform an extensive online search through an internet
search engine, and contact and search various libraries and/or archives.
A good faith diligent search for the copyright owner of a musical
composition may include a search of the Copyright Office’s online
records, contacting ASCAP, BMI, Harry Fox, or one of the other
musical rights organizations, and an extensive Internet search engine
search. A good faith diligent search for the copyright owner of a piece
of urban art (think the art of the artist Banksy59 or other graffiti artists)
may be very different; a search for this type of work may include a
search of the Copyright Office online records, a search of various
webpages dedicated to urban art,60 contacting various art galleries and
art schools near the location of the piece of art, possibly contacting
local police to inquire if they know the artist’s name and location, and
possibly even asking people near the location of the art piece if they
can identify the artist.
This last example may seem extreme, but the
recommendations are clear that each case is unique and that in some
cases more “out of the box” methods may be required. A lack of
identifying information for the copyright owner might be persuasive in
limiting a user’s search, but it is not determinative. The 2015 Report
notes that:
[A] search of Copyright Office records is only
necessary if sufficient identifying information already
exists on which to base the search. Users, however,
cannot rely solely on a lack of identifying
information; instead the user must undertake the most
comprehensive search possible in light of limited
information, because a lack of identifying
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information does not excuse a user from conducting
any searches.61
Therefore, as urban artists often use a nom de guerre when signing their
works, a user might be required to turn to unconventional sources to
identify the copyright owner, as discussed above.
The “reasonableness” of a search is extremely important, and
each search is a case unto itself. The Copyright Office went further in
emphasizing the important nature of searches by stating that the
proposed legislation includes the requirement that users take “any other
actions that are reasonably likely to be useful in identifying and
locating the copyright owner.”62 The Report goes on to state that a
search depends upon the facts that the user possesses and that the
search could be required to adapt, change, and expand during the
course of the search.63 A user also cannot assume that a search will be
without charge. The 2015 Report specifically notes that good faith
diligent searches may require the use of paid search websites or other
types of paid searches.64
To further clarify what constitutes a good faith diligent search,
the 2015 Report recommends that legislation include language that
would “[r]equire the Copyright Office to maintain and update
Recommended Practices for diligent searches for various categories of
works, through public consultation with interested stakeholders.”65
Furthermore, a search would only qualify as a good faith diligent
search if the user makes the diligent search to locate the copyright
owner prior to the use of the work and “at a time reasonably proximate
to” the beginning of the use.66 These qualifications, however, also
require definition. Does prior to the beginning of the use mean prior to
publication or prior to completing a derivative work that encompasses
the orphan work, or does it mean prior to any use whatsoever? By
extension, how close does “reasonably proximate” have to be prior to
use? The 2015 Report does not address these questions.
A user may reasonably conclude that because of the nature of
the orphan works case-by-case approach, each instance of “prior to
61
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use” and “reasonably proximate” could be different. But if this is the
case, then the user is provided no direction by the Copyright Office as
to what steps must be taken, and when, in order to qualify for the
orphan works limitation on liability. A user may perform an extensive
good faith diligent search before making any use of an orphan work but
the search may or may not be “reasonably proximate” to the use
depending upon the interpretation of “reasonably proximate” by a
court. Providing a definition of when use begins for orphan works
purposes and setting a definitive time period as being “reasonably
proximate” to use would provide both the copyright owner and user
important information for determining if a use would fall under an
orphan works limitation on liability.
b.

Foreign Searches

The global nature of copyright issues did not escape the
Copyright Office when preparing the 2015 Report and proposed orphan
work legislation. In the 2015 Report, two questions arose regarding
foreign searches: 1) what if a work is determined to be an orphan work
in a foreign jurisdiction and the user from the foreign jurisdiction wants
to use the work in the U.S.; and 2) what weight, if any, should a foreign
diligent search be given by U.S. courts when determining if a search
was diligent?67 In recognition of the global nature of copyright and the
expansion of orphan works legislation around the world, the Copyright
Office included specific provisions for addressing diligent searches
made under foreign copyright law. The Copyright Office proposes that
a U.S. court be given leeway to review and accept a qualifying diligent
search conducted under the orphan works legislation of a foreign
jurisdiction as part of a diligent search in the United States, on the
condition that the foreign jurisdiction also accepts qualifying U.S.
diligent searches.68
The answer to question number one was relatively
straightforward. The Copyright Office proposes that a user, whether the
same foreign jurisdiction user or a different user, would still be
required to perform a diligent search in the U.S., just like any other
user. This is a new approach for the Copyright Office. In previous
reports, the Copyright Office had not recommended the acceptance of
67
68
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foreign jurisdiction diligent searches. However, the Copyright Office
made a 180o turn in the most recent report. The 2015 Report cites the
orphan works laws of Canada, Hungary, and the United Kingdom as
examples of foreign jurisdictions that require diligent searches of
orphan works.69 The Copyright Office contends that diligent searches
from these foreign jurisdictions should be accepted because the orphan
works laws in each country require government approval of a search for
it to be deemed diligent and government approval to be given to use the
work as an orphan work.70 The Copyright Office posits that allowing
U.S. courts to accept diligent searches from foreign jurisdictions as
probative of a diligent search in the United States will open the door to
foreign jurisdictions allowing United States diligent searches the same
evidentiary weight in their jurisdictions.71 The Copyright Office,
however, is clear that a diligent search in a foreign jurisdiction is not a
replacement for a diligent search in the U.S. but is a potentially
important supplement to a diligent search in the United States. A
diligent search in the United States would still require a search of
Copyright Office records as well as other qualifying searches, but a
qualified foreign search could be presented as part of the diligent search
in the United States if a copyright owner were to challenge a user on
the basis of an insufficient diligent search.
c.

Searches for Visual Works

The issue of searches for visual works is of particular concern
for copyright owners due to the present technological limitations on
searching images compared to searching text. A text search is able to be
performed on numerous Internet search engines simply by entering a
portion of the text of the work into the search bar. However, at this
point in time, there is no such search available to the average person for
visual works. There is no way to do an Internet search by dropping a
JPEG of a photograph or a MP4 of a video into an internet search
engine, which puts potential users of orphan visual works at a
disadvantage compared to users of text works when performing diligent
searches.

69
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The issue of searches for visual works was acknowledged and
addressed in the 2015 Report.72 The Copyright Office contends in the
Report that the use of third-party registries for visual works alleviates
the search concern for users of visual orphan works by providing
cataloged sites on which copyright owners can register their works.73
The Report makes particular note of the Picture Licensing Universal
System (PLUS)74 as an important third-party registry where copyright
owners may register their works and where users may perform
searches.75 The Copyright Office acknowledges that searching PLUS
alone would not be a diligent search, but a search of PLUS in
conjunction with other searches could constitute a diligent search.76
The problem with the Copyright Office’s third-party registry
suggestion is that it makes a number of assumptions that do not hold up
under closer inspection. The Report makes the assumption that
copyright owners will register their works with third-party registries.77
However, the Copyright Office acknowledges that third-party
registries, such as PLUS, are geared towards professional artists and
not all photographers.78 Therefore, this immediately excludes a large
portion of photographs and copyright owners.79 The exclusion of this
large segment of copyright owners seems to be counter to the
Copyright Office’s stated purpose of bringing users and copyright
owners together.80
The Copyright Office also puts forth that third-party registries
will proliferate as more artists register their works.81 The Copyright
Office, however, provides little proof of this claim beyond the wording
“We believe . . . .”82 This is an important assumption because if it is
incorrect that third-party registries do not proliferate and that visual
artists do not register their works with third-party registries, then what
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diligent search options are available to users? The Report provides no
clear alternative to where users may search.
For the sake of argument, assume arguendo that at least
professional artists will register their works at increased rates. Then, the
questions become about cost and accessibility. Will third-party
registries be free to copyright owners and users, or will there be charges
involved for copyright owners to upload visual works and for users to
perform searches? The more charges involved in the deposit of works
or in the search of works, the less likely copyright owners and users
will participate in third-party registries. At this point, PLUS does not
charge for basic membership and searches, which is a benefit to
expanded use by both copyright owners and users.
PLUS, like most other third-party registries, as of this writing,
does not have a search engine for images.83 Searches are restricted to
textual search terms, which raises the issue of a user’s ability to search
through thousands, millions, or potentially billions of images. As
discussed above, there was an estimated one trillion photographs taken
worldwide in 2015.84 If one percent of those photographs was posted to
PLUS or another third party registry, they would constitute ten billion
photos for just 2015, let alone all of the photographs taken since the
invention of photography.85 It is extremely unlikely that with only a
text-based search that a user will be able to diligently search through
the 2015 photographs, let alone the billions of photos taken in previous
years.
The problem with the assumptions by the Copyright Office
regarding third-party registries is just that: they are assumptions. The
Copyright Office is assuming that a searchable database for visual
works that will allow copyright owners and users to connect and that is
simple, user-friendly, and inexpensive will be available sooner rather
than later. While this assumption might be reasonable based on the rate
at which technology advances, it is by no means guaranteed.86 Without
83
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sufficient technology to adequately sift through the billions of
photographs produced each year, a user of a visual work would be at a
significant disadvantage conducting a diligent search as opposed to
users of written material using basic text internet search engines or
even users of sound recordings using relatively new sound recording
identification software through free third-party search services such as
Shazam87 and SoundHound.88 Therefore, the Copyright Office should
not assume a technological solution will be developed to address the
area of copyright that has seen the greatest increase in content creation.
Reasonable diligent search parameters should be set forth by the
Copyright Office for each type of copyrightable work. These search
parameters should take into consideration the technological hurtles
confronting the average user when performing a good faith diligent
search.
d.

How “Diligent” Should A Diligent Search Be?

The good faith diligent search requirements set forth by the
Copyright Office are not universally endorsed. The matter of what
constitutes a diligent search and how a diligent search should be
defined has been addressed and pondered by many individuals and
groups.89 The diligent search issue boils down to how far will and
should a user go in his search for the copyright owner of a work and
how comprehensive should a diligent search be required to be?
As discussed above, the Copyright Office’s standard for a
diligent search fluctuates on a case-by-case basis90, but overall, the
recommended diligent search standards are to be set at a relatively high
level.91 Under the Copyright Office’s proposed legislation, the time and
cost to a user may not be insignificant in order to reach the level of a
diligent search for purposes of orphan works limitation on liability.92
The Center for the Study of the Public Domain at Duke University Law
School (Duke) argues that a diligent search should not be as exhaustive
87
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as the Copyright Office proposes.93 In its proposal on orphan works
submitted to the Copyright Office, Duke takes the position that search
requirements for orphan works should be less stringent due to an
increased difficulty of performing a reasonable search.94 Duke
postulates that modern technology is actually making the search
process more difficult instead of easier.95 The thought is that because of
worldwide distribution channels, the ever increasing number of
distribution formats, both physical and digital, and the ever increasing
amount of content created, locating a specific copyright owner of a
specific work is not tantamount to finding a needle in a haystack but
rather more like finding a particular needle in a needle stack.96
Basically, Duke proposes that it is often a near impossibility to identify
and locate a copyright owner, especially if the search is done in an
economical fashion.97
Duke then addresses the economic reality of the cost of doing
a reasonable search. Search costs are addressed on a dual front. First,
Duke argues that the economic reality of an orphan works search is that
if the search costs are too high, or just perceived to be too high prior to
attempting a search, the user will choose to abandon the search instead
of spending the money.98 The key, in this situation, is finding the
economic tipping point. Duke reasons that lower search requirements
will effectuate lower search costs, which would encourage more
searches to occur and more copyright owners to be united with users.99
Duke also proposes that searches should be tiered depending
upon the use of the orphan work as opposed to uniform search
requirements.100 The proposition is that since not all licensing fees are
the same and fluctuate greatly depending upon the use, likewise, so
should the extent and cost of a qualifying search.101 Duke proposes that
uses should be divided into different categories requiring different
levels of searches.102 A higher level of search would be required for
higher level commercial enterprises, while a lower level search would
93
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be required for economically minor uses, and virtually no search would
be required of a nonprofit entity such as a library, the provision of
notice being the primary requirement for nonprofits.103
The Duke proposal, while important to take into consideration,
may not afford copyright owners a sufficient level of protection. A
copyright owner’s rights must be balanced with the desire to afford
users greater latitude in the use of works whose owners are not readily
identifiable and/or locatable. The Duke proposal, however, also focuses
on another important aspect of proposed orphan works legislation:
notice of use.104
2.

Notice

The second step in the orphan works limitation on liability
pursuit is more straightforward than the good faith diligent search. The
user must provide notice to the Copyright Office of the user’s intention
to use the orphan work.105 This notice would be provided to a new
Copyright Office registry that would maintain and archive orphan
works Notice of Use filings.106 These new filings would be required to
include:
(1) the type of work used (under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a));
(2) a description of the work; (3) a summary of the
qualifying search conducted; (4) any other
identifying indicia available to the user; (5) the
source of the work (e.g., library or website where
work was located, publication where work originally
appeared); (6) a certification that the user performed
a qualifying search; and (7) the name of the user and
a description of how the work will be used.107
Beyond these notice requirements, the user would also be required to
provide attribution to the author and copyright owner of the work
whenever possible.108
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It should be noted that the notice requirements only require a
description of the work being used and do not require a submission of
the work being used.109 A submission of a copy of the actual work that
the user is utilizing along with a description of the work might be more
beneficial to a copyright owner searching the orphan works Notice of
Use archive. This would allow copyright owners to make a quick
determination whether or not the work that the user has provided notice
for is that copyright owner’s work. This would be an important search
element to all manners of work. Written works could be easily searched
for by copyright owners through a simple search of the database using a
sentence or two of the copyright owner’s work, much like is used by an
Internet search engine. A submission of a copy of the work being
utilized by the user may be even more important to the identification of
visual works by copyright owners. A description of a work, as required
in the proposed Notice of Use filing, is probably not sufficient for
copyright owners to conclusively identify their visual works being used
under a Notice of Use. This is due to the multitude of ways that a user
may choose to describe a visual work of art.
As an example, let us hypothesize that the Mona Lisa110 is still
under copyright in the United States and is an orphan work of which a
user wishes to make use. How may the user describe the work? A
portrait of a woman dressed in dark colors. A painting of a woman set
against a dark mountainous or hilly background. A portrait painting of
a woman with dark hair, dressed in period clothing. A woman painted
with a slight smile and wavy hair.
The Mona Lisa, arguably one of the most famous paintings in
the world, could be described in a Notice of Use potentially hundreds
of ways both brief and expansive. The problem is that any other
number of paintings could be described in similar manners with those
descriptions being just as accurate. Therefore, the work described in the
Notice of Use could be numerous different paintings. Without the
submission of a copy of the orphan work along with the description of
the work, it would be unlikely or impossible that a copyright owner
could identify a work by description alone. This would, more likely
than not, be antithetical to the intent of the proposed orphan works
legislation, which is to bring together users and copyright owners.
109
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The 2015 Report emphasizes the importance of filing notice
with the Copyright Office. The essential part of the notice is that the
Notice of Use filings will be maintained and archived in a database that
may be searched by copyright owners in order to bring users and
copyright owners together.111 However, nowhere in the 2015 Report
does the Copyright Office indicate two essential parts to the Notice of
Use filing and searchable orphan works archive: 1) what, if anything,
will a Notice of Use cost to file with the Copyright Office?; and 2)
what, if anything, will copyright owners be charged to access and
search the orphan works notice of use archive?
These questions are potentially as important as any other
question surrounding proposed orphan works legislation. Users will,
more likely than not, think with their wallets first when considering
moving forward with filing a Notice of Use. If the cost of filing a
Notice of Use, or possibly multiple Notices of Use for multiple orphan
works, is excessive or only slightly out of line with other copyright
charges, a user may forgo the process and roll the dice on a fair use
claim, or other defense, if the copyright owner ever happened upon the
infringing use. A similar situation may also arise for copyright owners
if there is a charge, large or small, for access to the orphan works
archive. A copyright owner may choose to forgo spending the money
on searching the orphan works archive on the outside chance that one
of the copyright owner’s works might show up in the archive,
especially if the amount of the reasonable license fee that the copyright
owner may receive from the user is not higher than the cost to access
the archive.
If the Copyright Office does charge a fee to file the Notice of
Use and also charges a fee to the copyright owner to search the orphan
works archive, it should first do a cost-benefit analysis to determine the
tipping point at which users and copyright owners will be willing to
participate. The Copyright Office’s goal in any orphan works
legislation is to bring orphan works owners and user together.112 This
goal could potentially be frustrated if the price points associated with
notice of use filings and copyright owner searches make it unappealing
and/or not cost effective to the intended copyright owners and users.
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Claim of Infringement

Once users have performed a good faith diligent search and
filed a Notice of Use with the Copyright Office, their paths are not yet
complete to reach the orphan works limitation on liability. The next
step would come upon a receipt of a Notice of Claim of Infringement,
which would bring about the requirement that the copyright owner and
the user negotiate reasonable compensation for the use of the work.113
The 2015 Report notes that “[w]here a user satisfies the eligibility
requirements of the orphan works legislation, monetary relief is limited
to ‘reasonable compensation.’”114 Reasonable compensation would not
include actual damages, statutory damages, costs, and attorneys’
fees.115 The Copyright Office proposes that the exclusion of costs and
attorneys’ fees from orphan works settlements is justified due to the
elimination of litigation.116 However, this proposition might be an oversimplification.
a.

Elimination of Damages, Costs, and Attorneys’ Fees

Section 505 of the 1976 Copyright Act states:
In any civil action under this title, the court
in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs
by or against any party other than the United States
or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by
this title, the court may also award a reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the
costs.117
Presently, attorneys’ fees are not available to plaintiffs in copyright
infringement cases where the infringement occurs prior to the
registration of the infringed work with the Copyright Office.118 The
elimination of attorneys’ fees under the proposed orphan works
legislation appears to presuppose that copyright owners will handle
claims of infringement themselves and forgo hiring an attorney. The
113
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Copyright Office postulates that the costs of litigation will be avoided
due to the requirement to negotiate reasonable compensation under the
proposed orphan works legislation.119 This avoidance of litigation will
therefore remove the need for costs and attorneys’ fees.120 However,
this hypothesis does not take into account multiple instances,
referenced in the 2015 Report, of courts addressing orphan works
issues, including the determination of reasonable compensation.
Copyright owners could realistically still end up in court paying
attorneys’ fees and costs, but the proceeding would be an orphan works
proceeding, so no attorneys’ fees or costs would be available.
The elimination of attorneys’ fees and costs from orphan
works cases could remove a key incentive for copyright owners to
register their works with the Copyright Office upon creation, instead of
after an infringement occurs. If the resulting reasonable compensation
from claims of infringement under the orphan works designation is the
same for registered and unregistered works, then this may deincentivize copyright owners from spending the extra money to register
their works.
The Copyright Office identified the potential for this situation,
at least in part. The proposed orphan works legislation allows for
“courts, when determining reasonable compensation, to take into
account the value, if any, added to a work by virtue of its registration
with the Copyright Office.”121 The reasoning behind this is that there
may be instances in which certain types of registered works, such as
instrumental sound recordings or works of visual art, are missed in a
search of the Copyright Office records due to lack of textual search
terms.122 A court could then impose a portion of the otherwise
applicable non-orphan works infringement damages on the user even if
the search was properly performed and the work was not locatable.123
The Copyright Office believes that this is an important exception in
order to encourage copyright registration and to reward owners that
register their copyrights.124 However, the proposed orphan works
legislation does not allow for the imposition of court costs or attorneys’
fees.
119
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The continued exclusion of costs and attorneys’ fees in this
situation could be a significant barrier to the copyright owner seeking
redress from a court. Alternatively, it could potentially cause a court to
increase the added value to the work in order to offset the costs and
attorneys’ fees required to bring the action. The significant barrier to
the copyright owner bringing a case in this situation is that potential
costs and attorneys’ fees may cost far more money than the copyright
owner plaintiff could hope to recover, even with an added value
increase in judgment from the court. A copyright owner plaintiff could
roll the dice and bring an action, hoping that the court will provide
added value to the work in an amount large enough to cover costs and
attorneys’ fees, but this is a significant gamble. This situation also
creates uncertainty in the judicial system as to when and in what
amount added value determinations should be made, which is not
beneficial to the copyright owner, the user, or the courts. Therefore,
costs and attorneys’ fees should be allowed in infringement claims
under the orphan works legislation dealing with registered works. The
alternative is inequitable and unfair to registered copyright owners and
has the potential of creating uncertainty for qualified users, which is
what orphan works legislation is attempting to avoid.
b.

Reasonable Compensation

The implementation of reasonable compensation under the
proposed orphan works legislation would act as a replacement for
traditional damages for infringement of both registered and
unregistered works. The 2015 Report notes that in the majority of cases
reasonable compensation will be the same or substantially similar to
what a reasonable license fee would have been for the use of the
work.125 The Copyright Office cites the case of Davis v. The Gap,
Inc.,126 noting that this case specifically addresses the “reasonable
license fee” formula as being “appropriate in situations where users
have sought to find the owner through a good faith diligent search.”127
Davis also sets forth the principle that the burden of establishing a fair
market value for the use of the work is to be borne by the copyright
owner.128
125
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The 2015 Report further notes that “reasonable compensation”
is the fair market valuation of a work “immediately” prior to the
infringement occurring.129 This burden of establishing an ex ante fair
market value for a work, based on the market immediately prior to the
use of the work, is not necessarily a readily accomplishable goal. The
establishment of a baseline fair market value for a specific work at a
specific moment in time, possibly years prior, could present the
copyright owner with a situation that is not tenable or cost effective.
The court in Davis determined, as noted by the Copyright Office, that it
fell to the copyright owner to prove that similarly situated copyright
owners licensed similarly situated works for similar licensing fees.130
This presents the copyright owner with a significant hurdle to
overcome when attempting to recover reasonable compensation from
the user. The copyright owner may have no baseline for what other
similarly situated works may have been licensed for at the time
immediately prior to the use. The copyright owner could be required to
pay fees to third-party experts to obtain a fair market analysis that
would determine what constitutes reasonable compensation. The fees
paid to third-party experts may exceed the determined amount of
reasonable compensation. Thus, the payment of fees to third parties for
valuation analysis could cause the copyright owner to take a financial
loss when seeking redress for copyright infringement under orphan
works legislation.
The potential for this scenario is acknowledged in the 2015
Report and alterations to strict fair market value evaluation are
addressed. The Copyright Office states that reasonable compensation
should include a percentage-based royalty as well as a one-time, fixed
sum in order to avoid a user reaping an unfair windfall if the use of the
work is a commercial success.131 The Copyright Office, however,
provides almost no guidance on how a percentage-based royalty might
be applied or when it would be appropriate to be applied, with the
exception of stating that a court may determine that a percentage-based
royalty could constitute a form of reasonable compensation in the case
of the ongoing use of the work in a user’s derivative work.132
The problem with this scenario is two-fold: 1) it does not
address the copyright owner’s attorneys’ fees, as discussed above, and
129
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the cost issues of determining the fair market value immediately prior
to initial use and determining a royalty percentage basis; and 2) it
creates a stronger bargaining position for the user.
This situation has the potential to shift significant costs onto
the copyright owner. This is particularly true in the case of copyright
owners with registered works, as discussed above regarding attorneys’
fees. The Copyright Office does not address the costs to the copyright
owner in providing proof of what reasonable compensation would be,
let alone what the costs to the copyright owner to determine what a fair
percentage-based royalty rate might be. Although, the Copyright Office
does tip its hand slightly toward copyright owners who register their
works when it made the assumption that “an owner who registers his or
her works likely has more interest in its exploitation.”133 However, at
no place in the 1976 Copyright Act is an interest in exploiting a work
mentioned or cited as being determinative in a copyright owner being
compensated for the use of a work. The Copyright Office simply cites
Davis and then moves forward under the assumption that all costs of
determining reasonable compensation for the use of a work are to be
borne by the copyright owner.
The second issue in this matter, the stronger bargaining
position of the user, is created when the user of a relatively or
completely unknown work, which would probably include the majority
of orphan works (otherwise they would not be orphaned), negotiates a
relatively low reasonable compensation for the use of the work with the
copyright owner based on the fair market value of the work
immediately prior to the time of initial use. A relatively low reasonable
compensation can be assumed by the fact that the work was little
known or unknown at the time of initial use, as opposed to a work by a
famous artist such as Roy Lichtenstein,134 Bob Dylan,135 or Dan
Brown.136
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The user then has the upper hand in negotiation of future uses
of the work, if any. The user could simply cease using the work, pay
the relatively low reasonable compensation, and make the argument
that any royalty-based payments should be extremely low based on the
perceived value and bargaining power of the copyright owner
immediately prior to initial use. This argument could be expanded to
include the exclusion of any type of royalty fee due to industry
standards at the time immediately prior to initial use of the work and/or
the existence of other non-royalty-based license agreements
contemporaneous with the time immediately preceding the initial use.
These situations would potentially allow the user to walk away having
reaped the windfall of the use without bearing any of the costs required
of the copyright holder to prove the value of the work immediately
prior to use, while paying a small amount in reasonable compensation
and possibly no royalty.
As noted previously, the professed intention of orphan works
legislation is to bring copyright owners and users together. The
Copyright Office also contends that orphan work legislation would
economically benefit copyright owners and users through the
streamlining of the system to provide more access to works to be used.
However, the shouldering of the costs by the copyright owner to prove
the worth of a work immediately prior to the work’s use by the user,
along with the potential for the reasonable compensation for the use of
the work to be relatively low, could be a deterrent rather than an
incentive.
If a copyright owner must bear the uncertainty of the costs
required to make a determination of the value of his or her work with
the possibility that he or she could end up out-of-pocket hundreds or
thousands of dollars, then what is the incentive for the copyright owner
to value or participate in the orphan works system? A savvy user could
refuse to pay the copyright owner reasonable compensation without
first being provided with at least three estimates of valuation from
accredited experts in copyright valuation in the relevant subset works
(books, painting, photographs, musical compositions, etc.). This stance
of the user would be based on the proposition set forth by the
Copyright Office that the cost of proving reasonable compensation is
borne by the copyright owner.
The copyright owner would then be required to pay hundreds
or thousands of dollars for expert copyright valuations in order to prove
the value of the work immediately prior to the use. With no potential
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for cost shifting to the user, the copyright owner may determine that the
cost of copyright valuation outweighs the benefit of reasonable
compensation. This would then lead to the user receiving the “unfair
windfall”137 that the Copyright Office is seeking to avoid. Furthermore,
the copyright owner, due to financial hardship, may not be able to hire
experts to provide a copyright valuation to the user. In this situation,
the user would again be receiving an “unfair windfall”138 and
disadvantaging a party already experiencing financial difficulties
through being denied the reasonable compensation due to her for the
use of the work.
A reasonable solution to the costs and attorneys’ fees issues
would be, at a minimum, to allow the recovery of costs and attorneys’
fees for registered copyrights. This would maintain the status quo in
providing incentives to copyright owners to register their works. A
better solution for all works under the orphan works system would be
to allow the court to award recovery of costs and attorneys’ fees if no
reasonable compensation is agreed upon through good faith negotiation
within a set amount of time determined by the Copyright Office. This
would incentivize the copyright owner and the user to work together to
resolve the matter in a timely fashion. It would also encourage the
copyright owner and the user to be economical and reasonable in their
respective demands for reasonable compensation and proof of
valuation, as the costs of unreasonable demands and/or requirements
could end up being borne by the demanding party. The potential for
both the copyright owner and the user to bear the costs and attorneys’
fees of the other is a possibly strong incentive to come to a mutually
agreeable, reasonable compensation.
c.

Injunctive Relief

Injunctive relief is a mainstay of copyright remedies.139 It
allows copyright owners to control their copyrights and affords them a
form of relief when monetary damages are curtailed or unavailable.
However, injunctive relief under the proposed orphan works
legislation, while technically still available, could be curtailed for most
copyright owners and unavailable to other copyright owners when the
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user has complied with the proposed search and notice of use
requirements.
The 2015 Report proposes that courts restrain the use of
injunctive relief in cases where the user has gone through the proper
search and notice of use requirements proscribed in the orphan works
legislation.140 The Copyright Office proposes that a court “should
account for the harm caused by users’ reliance on the orphan works
provision.”141 Essentially, it is proposed that if a user establishes the
minimum steps to be in compliance with the search and notice
requirements of the orphan works legislation, the court should provide
certain leeway for the user. An example of this is that a court may
enjoin a user from “further printing or publication of copies of an
orphan work, but permit the retail sale of existing copies.”142 Thus, the
user would reap the benefit of following the orphan works search and
notice of use requirements and be able to profit from the orphan work,
while the copyright owner would be able to stop any further use of the
work in the creation of new products and receive reasonable
compensation, as discussed above, for the use of the work in the
existing products. On the surface this arrangement appears to be
relatively fair and equitable to both the copyright owner and the user.
However, it is when one begins to dig down and take deeper
considerations into account that this injunctive relief proposal becomes
concerning to copyright owners.
The two main areas of concern addressed in the 2015 Report
and provided for specifically in the proposed orphan works legislation
are the role of injunctive relief in cases involving derivative works and
in cases of derivative works involving an author’s honor and reputation.
These two areas for potential injunctive relief are addressed very
differently in the 2015 Report than in the legislation.
In the matter of derivative works, the Copyright Office
endorses a position favorable to the user. The Copyright Office
proposes that “a user may, upon paying a reasonable compensation to
the owner of the work in a reasonably timely manner and providing
attribution (where requested), avoid an injunction and continue to
prepare and use the new work.”143 The reasoning behind this position is
that the user, having fulfilled the search and notice requirements, would
140
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have a good faith basis for moving forward to create a new derivative
work that would effectively entangle the orphan work with the user’s
new creative content in a manner that would mean irreparable damage
to the user’s new derivative work if injunctive relief were allowed.144
The Copyright Office further notes that the restriction on injunctive
relief for derivative works runs for the life of the orphan works
copyright, which would allow the user to use the derivative work
without restriction, regardless of objections from the orphan work’s
owner. This would also allow for full copyright protection for the
derivative work.145
This proposal for limitations on injunctive relief did not go
uncontested. The Copyright Office noted that these limitations were
concerning to some and that this was a substantial exit from a
traditional tenant of copyright law: the copyright owner’s exclusive
right to control.146 In the matter of injunctive relief for derivative
works, the 2015 Report specifically noted a differentiation between a
concern for copyright owners and authors. The Copyright Office sets
forth the proposition that when the copyright owner is also the author
of the work, a higher risk of damage to the author is present through
potential harm to honor and/or reputation.147 Therefore, the Copyright
Office created a special proviso in the proposed orphan works
legislation specifically for author-owners of copyrights. This provision
allows for injunctive relief for an orphan work derivative work “only if
the continued preparation or use of the new work would be prejudicial
to the author-owner’s honor or reputation, and a Court finds that such
harm cannot be cured through reasonable compensation.”148 This
means that in order to take advantage of injunctive relief in a derivative
work situation, the court must determine that: 1) the copyright owner is
also an author of the orphan work; 2) the copyright owner-author has
suffered some form of harm to his/her honor and/or reputation; and 3)
the harm suffered by the copyright owner-author cannot be reasonably
compensated monetarily.
This provision for injunctive relief is an important exception
to the proposed limitations on injunctive relief for derivatives works in
144
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orphan works. Unfortunately, this exception is also too narrowly
drafted. The requirement that this exception only apply to copyright
owner-authors puts non-author copyright owners at a distinct
disadvantage in the control of their works, especially when considering
the potential damage to a copyright owner through forced association
with an unsavory or damaging user. As an example, what if an author
gifted or willed her copyrights to the Simon Wiesenthal Center149 or her
synagogue and one of the works was then used as an orphan work to
create a derivative work glorifying the holocaust or advocating for the
American Nazi Party?150 Or, what if the Gordon Parks Foundation151
found that a photograph taken by Mr. Parks and the copyright held by
the Gordon Parks Foundation was listed in the orphan works archive by
a user who had satisfied the search and notice requirements and was
using the photo in a derivative work that advocated for the Ku Klux
Klan?152 Should these non-author copyright owners not be entitled to
injunctive relief? Are the associations created by the derivative uses not
potentially harmful to the name and reputation of the non-author
copyright owners in a manner not rectifiable through monetary
compensation?
Limitations on injunctive relief under the proposed orphan
works legislation are an important piece to furthering the purpose of the
proposed legislation. Injunctive relief, however, should be addressed on
a case-by-case basis, just as qualification as an orphan work is
addressed on a case-by-case basis. The near blanket exclusion of
injunctive relief for derivative works of orphan works puts copyright
owners at a distinct disadvantage and takes the right to control one’s
copyright out of the hands of the copyright owner. Furthermore,
copyright owner-authors are not the only parties that may suffer
irreparable harms from damage to honor and/or reputation due to
association with a user and/or a derivative work that are not
compensable with monetary damages. As set forth in the hypotheticals
above, non-author copyright owners could suffer the same or
substantially similar harms to honor and/or reputation through these
unwanted and forced associations. Because of this, non-author
149
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copyright owners should also be eligible for injunctive relief in these
exceptional cases. Orphan works legislation should address injunctive
relief and seek to encourage amicable resolution between owners of
orphan works and users. It should not, however, restrict the use of
injunctive relief by the courts to the point that it forces copyright
owners to accept associations with users regardless of how offensive or
distasteful those uses might be to the copyright owner or how
unconscionable the use might be in a non-orphan works setting. The
balance of copyright owners’ rights with orphan works users’ rights
under any orphan works legislation should, when in doubt, always
carefully lean in favor of the copyright owner, because a copyright
owner’s rights in the orphan work are senior to a user’s right to use.
4.

Fair Use

The issue of fair use is discussed extensively in the 2015
Report. The Copyright Office acknowledges that its approach to fair
use in regards to orphan works legislation has changed significantly
since the 2006 Report.153 The 2006 Report generally dismissed fair use
as inapplicable because orphan works uses would be beyond the
application of fair use.154 The 2015 Report, however, reverses this
view. The Copyright Office now takes the stance that fair use continues
to be an important mechanism that can both co-exist with orphan works
legislation and benefit users whether or not users choose to avail
themselves of an orphan works limitation of liability. The 2015 Report
specifically notes that, “The application of fair use to new fact patterns,
such as uses of orphan works, is an essential aspect of copyright law
jurisprudence, and should not be foreclosed by the introduction of a
limitation on liability.”155
The importance of fair use is not overlooked by the Copyright
Office as an important affirmative defense available to users.156 Fair
use is also not overlooked by opponents of orphan works legislation.
The Library Copyright Alliance (LCA) argued that the recent advances
in fair use law sufficiently address LCA needs and that orphan works

153

Id. at 41.
Id.
155
Id. at 70.
156
Id. at 40.
154

239

THE ORPHAN WORKS PROBLEM

[7:202 2016]

legislation would be overly complex and restrictive and any benefits
would be offset by diligent search requirements.157
The arguments against orphan works legislation in favor of
fair use are not without merit. The diligent search and notice
requirements proposed in the orphan works legislation have the
potential to be cumbersome, time consuming, and expensive. However,
there is no requirement in the proposed orphan works legislation that
requires users to first avail themselves of orphan works protections or
that forestalls users from taking advantage of fair use prior to a
potential orphan works analysis. LCA members could continue to avail
themselves of fair use exclusively and completely forego any options
afforded them under an orphan works limitation of liability.
The Copyright Office acknowledged the possibility that some
users may prefer the fair use route as opposed to the orphan works
limitation on liability. The 2015 Report notes that, “less risk-averse
entities may prefer testing the limits of fair use instead of undertaking
good faith diligent searches, and they should not be precluded from
making that choice.”158 The inclusion of this language in the 2015
Report appears to be a direct response to concerns with of a potential
limitation of fair use due to the implementation of orphan works
legislation. In order to assure that there was no implication of
restraining the use of fair use, a provision was included in the draft
legislation that specifically states that fair use, along with all other
rights and defenses under copyright law, are preserved.159
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The proposed orphan works legislation in the 2015 Report, as
with most proposed legislation, has strong points and points that may
require clarification, reconsideration, and revision. The draft legislation
is an improvement over the past proposed orphan works legislation, but
it is not sufficiently drafted to the point that it should be considered for
enactment.
The first change that should be applied to any orphan works
legislation is that it should provide a definition of what constitutes an
orphan work. A proposed definition may appear similar to:
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An Orphan Work is any original work of
authorship, whether published or unpublished,
registered or unregistered, which is not in the public
domain and whose owner(s) cannot be identified,
located, and/or contacted by a prospective user of the
work following a reasonably diligent, good faith
search for the copyright owner(s) identity and
location.
While perhaps a bit drawn out, this definition provides a more
substantive description of what constitutes an orphan work than the
definitions provided above.160 This definition also puts all copyright
owners and users on notice that any work not in the public domain
could potentially fall into the orphan works realm.
Orphaned works legislation should also make clear that a new
affirmative action is possibly required of all copyright owners. In
certain circumstances ,copyright owners could now be required to
actively engage all requests for licenses or potentially suffer the fate of
being deemed un-locatable and having a work classified as an orphan
work. However, to alleviate some of the imposition this potential new
affirmative response requirement lays upon copyright owners, a
searchable affirmative notice from copyright owners archive should be
established, much like the proposed Notice of Use archive for users.
This affirmative notice archive would be a location where
copyright owners could file their names, contact information, and lists
of works that are not available for license. One key provision to this
recommendation is that the filing fee for copyright owners should be
very low or nonexistent. If a copyright owner took advantage of this
affirmative step to file with this archive, this would satisfy the
copyright owner’s requirement to respond to all licensing requests. This
archive would be searchable by users and would be a mandatory
portion of any good faith diligent search. Any unauthorized use of any
work listed on this archive would not be subject to protection under the
orphan works limitation on liability. The copyright owner could then
proceed with an infringement case against the unauthorized user
unfettered by orphan works restrictions on remedies. This archive
would also further the Copyright Office’s desire of alleviating the
orphan works problem by providing a location where copyright owners
160
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can provide notice to users without having to deal with users on an
individual basis.
The limitation on liability model proposed by the Copyright
Office generally appears to be the best option for the United States
copyright system. The case-by-case approach of the orphan works
legislation is a fair balance to the blanket approach supported by the
Copyright Office for mass digitalization legislation. A case-by-case
approach provides copyright owners with reasonable assurance that
their works cannot be widely used by any user that wishes to exploit the
copyright user’s work. At the same time, a case-by-case approach also
provides users a fair chance at using works, while limiting potential
liability, which may otherwise be unusable due to the inability of the
user to identify and locate the copyright owner of the work.
The requirements for a good faith diligent search under the
case-by-case limited liability model, however, are an area of contention
that is not so easily solved. The Copyright Office’s requirements in the
2015 Report for a good faith diligent search are awkward and
burdensome on the user. Search requirements are not well defined;
searches must be extensive; and searches may possibly be expensive if
paid searches must be performed. All of this would be required without
providing the user assurance that the search will be deemed diligent for
purposes of orphan works limitation on liability. The lack of definitive
search requirements leaves the user open to liability if the user’s search
is determined, for whatever reason a court may find, not to be diligent.
The combination of time, money, and doubt are detrimental factors that
tend to suggest that users may forego the orphan works process in favor
of rolling the dice that no copyright owner will step forward or, in the
alternative, mounting a fair use defense.
The Duke proposal for search requirements is the yang to the
Copyright Office’s yin. The Duke proposal imposes very few
requirements on the user to perform a diligent search and focuses more
heavily on the provision of notice. Herein lies the rub: a search should
be diligent and performed with the intent of discovering the copyright
owner of a work, but it also should not be overly expensive and time
consuming. A middling of the Copyright Office’s proposed
requirements and those proposed by Duke appears to be optimal. The
problem with this is how to define it.
A search of the Copyright Office’s archives, including
copyright registration archives, orphan works notice archives, and
copyright owner affirmative response archives, as proposed above,
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should be mandatory for all searches. However, from that point
forward, the defining of a reasonably diligent search becomes much
more difficult. As discussed previously, the search for the copyright
owner of a poem would probably be much different than a search for
the copyright owner of a photograph. The difficulty in defining at what
point a particular search becomes diligent without being overly
burdensome on the user is the issue in the diligent search dilemma.
A reasonable solution to this dilemma is to install semi-rigid
search requirement for orphan works searches that is annually or
biannually reviewed and updated by the Copyright Office with input
from copyright owners. Initial diligent search requirements could
provide that users wishing to avail themselves of the orphan work
limitation on liability would be required to perform searches of
Copyright Office registration archives, Copyright Office Orphaned
Works Notice of Use archives, Copyright Office Copyright Owner
Affirmative Notice archives, a minimum of ten general Internet search
engine searches, and searches of other databases and websites geared
specifically toward the particular type of work being researched. All of
these searches would be required to be documented either electronically
through screen captures or through paper sources such as printing out
screenshots. All documented searches would also be required to contain
time and date stamps for verification that the search was performed
prior to the use of the orphan work. Further, as provided for in the
proposed orphan works legislation, each use of any work would require
a separate search that comported with the required search requirements.
A new user could not depend solely upon a search conducted by a
previous user of the same work, but a previous user’s search could be
cited as part of the new user’s diligent search. Certified diligent foreign
searches may also qualify as part of a reasonably diligent search as
determined on a case-by-case basis by a court.
The notice requirements proposed by the Copyright Office are
substantial. However, the proposed Notice of Use requirements, while
requiring the filing of the user’s name, is silent on any requirement of
the user to provide contact information in the event that the copyright
owner should find the notice and want to contact the user. The
provision of contact information for the user would be an important
piece for bringing the copyright owner and user together. Imagine
being a copyright owner and finding that a Notice of Use is filed with
the Copyright Office for one of your works and the name of the user
who filed the notice is James Smith, the most popular male name in the
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United States,161 but there is no contact information for Mr. Smith.
With nearly 40,000162 James Smiths in the United States, the task for
the copyright owner to find James Smith the user would be daunting.163
Common sense dictates that contact information for a user, in the form
of an email address, telephone number, or physical address, would be
required when a notice of use is filed with the Copyright Office. Users’
contact information should also be required to be kept up to date by the
user for the benefit of copyright owners. Without these features, the
point of orphan works legislation, to bring copyright owners and users
together, is stymied from the outset.
The other notice requirement recommendation, as discussed
above, is the cost of filing a notice of use. The filing of a notice of use
should be inexpensive or free, if done electronically. It can be
reasonably concluded that a substantial filing cost would act as a barrier
to filing a notice for many users. If the intended purpose of orphan
works legislation is to foster access to works that would otherwise be
inaccessible due to copyright restraints, then it would be logical to
maintain the lowest price point possible to encourage maximum use.
The elimination of attorneys’ fees for claims of infringement
under orphan works legislation for registered works is troubling. As
discussed previously, the elimination of attorneys’ fees under an orphan
works limitation on liability could negatively impact a copyright
owner’s willingness to register a work.164 The intention of orphan
works legislation, to open up access to works for qualified users by
providing limitations on liability, should not overpower a copyright
owner’s rights to aggressively enforce his/her rights. The cost of
pursuing an infringement claim can be substantial, and attorneys’ fees
are a significant factor in that cost. If a copyright owner is forced to
shoulder the cost of attorneys’ fees then that could act as a deterrent to
the copyright owner to pursue reasonable compensation from a user.
Similarly, the elimination of costs is another significant
deterrent to copyright owners seeking reasonable compensation under
orphan works limitation on liability. The cost to the copyright owner of
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providing valuations for a work immediately prior to the
implementation of the use of the work by the user could be substantial.
These substantial costs, like attorneys’ fees, could dissuade a copyright
owner from seeking reasonable compensation from a user if those costs
and attorneys’ fees are not potentially recoupable.
Reasonable compensation for the use of a work is not
reasonable if the compensation does not take into consideration the
expense that the copyright owner incurred to establish and retrieve said
reasonable compensation. The limited liability purpose of orphan works
legislation needs to be balanced against a copyright owner’s costs in
protecting her copyright. An equitable compromise in this situation
would be the installation of a system for registered works that mimics
the remedies for infringement that presently exist. If a registered work
is legitimately registered as an orphan work, the copyright owner would
then have the choice of seeking reasonable compensation from the user
under a statutory damages scale, the scale for orphan works statutory
damages being a significantly lower amount than the standard
infringement range, or choose to do a valuation for the purpose of
showing the likelihood of what a licensing fee would have been if
entered into immediately prior to the use. Taking the statutory damages
route could be a faster and less involved process for a copyright owner
and user but less precise in valuation. Performing a valuation could be
more precise in determining the actual value of the work immediately
prior to the use but also more time consuming and expensive. When
evaluating a reasonable compensation, a court could take these factors
into account and apply none, part, or all of the cost of valuation on the
user. This uncertainty would act as a motivator for both copyright
owners and users to negotiate under the orphan works statutory
damages range to avoid potentially higher and indeterminate costs. This
would also eliminate the disincentive to registration that could occur if
attorneys’ fees and costs were eliminated for registered works under
orphan works legislation.
At the same time, no provision for costs or attorneys’ fees for
unregistered works under orphan works legislation may provide a
further incentive to copyright owners to register their works. The
Copyright Office estimates that the majority of orphan works will be
comprised of unregistered works. Registered works, which would
comprise the minority of orphan works, would maintain the advantages
of registration, while unregistered works, which would comprise the
majority of orphan works, would have no such benefits and would
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provide significant limitations on liability to qualified orphan works
users.
The potential curtailment or elimination of injunctive relief
under orphan works legislation is a significant diversion from copyright
procedures. As discussed above, injunctive relief is often the first
remedy sought in an infringement suit and potentially the only remedy
received. The proposed orphan works legislation does not eliminate
injunctive relief completely, but it does restrain it significantly
regarding derivative works and in the area of reputational harm.
Furthermore, the 2015 Report makes clear that the Copyright Office’s
intention is to limit the application of injunctive relief by the courts in
most orphan works cases.165
Injunctive relief is an important remedy in infringement cases
that should be available to all copyright owners. That being said, the
intention of the Copyright Office to strike a balance between copyright
owners’ rights and users’ good faith use of orphan works is an
important consideration. The Copyright Office’s proposal to exempt
derivative works from injunctive relief is logical when all orphan works
requirements are met and the copyright owner and user agree to a
reasonable compensation. A user that creates a derivative work after
doing a good faith diligent search and filing notice of use should not
have to fear that if the copyright owner of the original work comes
forward that the derivative work would be enjoined from any further
use. This limitation on injunctive relief would act as an encouragement
to qualified users to utilize orphan works and invest in the creation of
derivative works, as the Copyright Office contends. However, as
discussed,166 the 2015 Report does recognize that the unavailability of
injunctive relief for derivative works is not appropriate in all situations.
The Copyright Office proposes that injunctive relief for
derivative works be available only when reasonable compensation is
insufficient to remedy the claimed harm to honor and/or reputation and
the copyright owner is also the author of the original work.167 In order
for injunctive relief to be applied in this situation, a court would need to
determine that the continued preparation or use of the derivative work
would be so detrimental to a copyright owner-author’s reputation
and/or honor that the harm could not be curried by reasonable

165

ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 6, at 67.
See supra Part III.B.3.c.
167
ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 6, at 68.
166

[7:202 2016] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW REVIEW

246

compensation alone.168 This approach, while intended to address
copyright owner-authors’ concerns and find a balance between good
faith users and copyright owner-authors, is too restrictive. Copyright
owner-authors are not the only parties that can suffer harm that would
be prejudicial to their reputation or honor. There are many situations
where a non-author copyright owner, whether individual or
organization, could suffer prejudicial and possibly irreparable harm to
her reputation and/or honor due to association with a derivative work
whose content or author is antithetical to the non-author copyright
owners moral stance and/or reputation in the community. It is for this
reason that orphan works legislation should not limit injunctive relief to
only copyright owner-authors in cases of derivative works. Courts
should have the ability to decide the application of injunctive relief on a
case-by-case basis for any copyright owner that claims prejudicial harm
to reputation and honor, regardless of authorship status.
The Copyright Office’s new stance on fair use in the 2015
Report deserves recognition and endorsement. Fair use is arguably
more important to copyright at this moment in time than at any
previous time in its history. The importance of fair use is no longer a
consideration just for potential copyright users but also for copyright
owners.169 The continued availability of fair use in conjunction with
orphan works legislation would provide users important protections and
peace of mind when entering the orphan works arena. Theoretically, a
user could do a good faith diligent search, as interpreted by the user,
with an eye on fair use as a back-up defense. If a copyright owner were
to sue for infringement in this situation and the court were to determine
that the user’s search was not diligent or the notice of use was faulty,
the user would still be afforded the opportunity to present a fair use
defense. In the alternative, a user could choose to forego the orphan
works limitation on liability completely and move forward using a
work under a theory of fair use alone.170 The Copyright Office’s
decision to specifically address and maintain fair use in the proposed
orphan works legislation is an indication of the importance of fair use
to copyright users.
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CONCLUSION

The discussion of orphan works, the analysis of the 2015
Report and the proposed orphan works legislation, and the
recommendations for proposed orphan works legislation are not easily
structured. Very few, if any, matters are black and white when dealing
with orphan works. Opinions still differ as to whether there is an
orphan works problem at all, or, if there is, whether the orphan works
problem requires legislation or if existing legal principles are sufficient
to address the issue.171 The reality is that no one can say with certainty
what benefit or detriment orphan works legislation may bring.
Copyright owners, copyright users, the Copyright Office,
lawmakers, experts, practitioners, and lay people can speculate over the
positive and negative results of orphan works legislation but none can
know what impact, if any, it will have until it is enacted. However,
there are two things that none of the people or groups involved in and
concerned with the orphan works issue can deny: 1) technology is
causing the proliferation of the number of original works of authorship,
whether published or unpublished, that are entering the public view on
a daily basis, which in turn have the potential to swell the orphan works
ranks; and 2) any orphan works legislation enacted will be a twentyfirst century addition to a twentieth century Act.
Orphaned works legislation, while well intentioned, is a
stopgap approach to dealing with the issue of the proliferation of
orphan works, especially in new technology. It is a digital patch added
onto an 8-track tape172 copyright statute. A standalone orphan works
addition to the 1976 Copyright Act is not the solution to the orphan
works issue. It is, more likely than not, another piece of legislation that
will lead to unintended consequences, much like the dropping of
copyright notice requirement for publication or the continuous
extension of copyright terms.173
The consequences of eliminating the copyright notice
requirement have had a direct impact upon the increase in orphan
works. Prior to January 1, 1978, if a work was published without
171
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copyright notice, it went immediately into the public domain, and from
January 1, 1978, until March 1, 1989, if a work was published without
copyright notice and not subsequently registered with the Copyright
Office within five years, the work fell to the public domain.174
However, since March 1, 1989, there has been no copyright notice
requirement, which has allowed people to publish millions and possibly
billions of works, depending on how publication is interpreted, without
the requirement for any identification of copyright ownership and still
maintain copyright ownership. This plethora of works, which in the
past would have flowed directly into the public domain, now often
flows into the ocean of orphan works instead.
Similarly, the progressive extension of copyright terms has
created a situation where virtually no new works are entering the public
domain. The retention of copyrights in private hands for longer and
longer periods, much like the changes in copyright formalities, is
exacerbating the orphan works problem. Orphaned works legislation is
then needed to attempt to alleviate the problem caused by the
elimination of copyright formalities and the extension of copyright
terms. Changes to the 1976 Copyright Act were held out as benefits
when enacted by Congress.
Congress should look to institute a new copyright act instead
of adding another patch to cover holes in the current copyright statute
created by previous changes. A new copyright act could smoothly
update and integrate changes to the United States copyright system.175
A new copyright Act could also integrate the orphan works issue into
the structure of the new act and account for issues such as notice,
publication, and search requirements. A Band-Aid176 is great for a
scraped knee but not very effective for fixing a broken leg.
Unfortunately, orphan works legislation is the equivalent of a BandAid, and the 1976 Copyright Act is the broken leg. Orphan works
legislation might stop the bleeding for a while, but the leg is still
broken. So is our current system of copyright.
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